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Abstract 
Modern states, with their overwhelmingly encompassing 
jurisdictions, cannot rely on the traditional judiciary for 
expeditiousness. Hence, administrative adjudication is on 
the rise. The National Company Law Tribunal and the 
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal were 
introduced into company law, fifteen years ago, in 2002. 
The new company law legislation of 2013 acclimatized 
some of the suggestions made by the Supreme Court and 
the Madras High Court, but not all. Despite being 
established and functioning for a year now, the tribunals 
suffer from certain infirmities which should have been 
rectified after the judiciary had advised so. This article 
traces the journey of the constitution of the tribunals, 
examines the constitutionality of the provisions as they 
stand, and concludes by suggesting certain modifications 
to the existing legislation. 
Keywords: Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016, Constitutionality, 
Judicial Members, Technical Members, Tribunal 
I. Introduction 
Administrative adjudication is an essential part of modern states. 
As Wade and Phillips put it, questions in a modern state “cannot be   
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appropriately solved by applying objective legal principles”, but 
rather, “in public interest, as matter of social policy”.1 Technical 
expertise is considered a better alternative to the judicial principles 
of a judge. Hence, the desirability of tribunals is at its maxima in 
various faculties.2 Specialized adjudication is sought in many fields 
of law, including patents, antitrust, commerce etc. Although 
alternative dispute resolution is seen as an enterprise incorporating 
such specialization, it nevertheless suffers from faults such as its 
inability to create precedents.3 Therefore, in areas such as company 
litigation, there is a need for a specialized administrative court. 
Such bodies assist in overcoming multiple shortcomings of the 
traditional court systems, apart from the advantage of having 
technical members present on the panel. For example, the 
envisioned company tribunal reduces the longevity of a winding 
up proceeding that could span across twenty to twenty-five years, 
to merely two years.4 The consideration that such non-traditional 
courts degrade the ordinary court system is mythical. In fact, 
specialized commercial courts have ushered in an unprecedented 
era of business facilitation in jurisdictions where they are 
constituted.5 Therefore, tribunals for company disputes become a 
necessity not only for their expeditiousness and special expertise, 
but also for proliferation of trade and commerce. 
In India, miscellany bodies act as an expeditious and advantageous 
alternative to courts of law, with recent additions to this list being 
the National Company Law Tribunal (hereinafter, the Tribunal), and 
                                                          
1 WADE AND PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 699 (1965). 
2 1 G P SINGH AND ALOK ARADHE (EDS), M P JAIN AND S N JAIN PRINCIPLES 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 696-699 (2010). 
3 Carl N Pickereill, Specialised Adjudication in an Administrative Forum: 
Bridging the Gap between Public and Private Law, 82(4) Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1605, 1605-6 (2013). 
4 Union of India v R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 4. 
5 Justice Jack B Jacobs, The Role of Specialised Courts in Resolving Corporate 
Governance Disputes in the United States and in the EU: An Amercan Judge's 
Perspective, THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 18, 2006), www.oecd.org/ daf/ ca/ 
corporategovernanceprinciples/37188750.pdf. 
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the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter, the 
Appellate Tribunal). The two have been constituted recently,6 but 
have been part of the law, on paper for nearly one and a half 
decade. They were incorporated in law, subsequently pulled into 
courts for doubts over their constitutionality, reintroduced with 
some changes in a new legislation and further petitioning 
continued, etc.7 Regardless of the fact that the tribunals have 
undergone an elaborate process of legal scrutiny, they are still 
frowned upon for multiple reasons as they require sundry 
amendments to be compatible with the Constitution. This article 
considers various provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, relating 
to the tribunals and critically analyses them with respect to their 
constitutionality, and suggests certain changes in the prevailing 
position, to ameliorate unconstitutionality or other shortcomings. 
II. The Constitution of the Tribunals 
The adjudication relating to company matters in India was divided 
into three separate jurisdictions before the Tribunal was 
envisioned. Firstly, there was the Company Law Board, then the 
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, and the High 
Courts, having their own subject matter to adjudicate upon.8 The 
multiplicity of jurisdictions was indeed vexatious. Nevertheless, 
the suggestion for the Tribunal came from an unlikely source. A 
committee was established under the chairmanship of Justice 
Vettath Balakrishna Eradi, to analyze the processes relating to 
winding up of companies. Despite not having any pre-sanctioned 
matter of reference, the Committee advised that there was a need 
                                                          
6 SO 1932(E), Ministry of Corporate Affairs – Notification, (Nov.1,2016), 
nclt.gov.in/orders/Notification_02062016_II.pdf. 
7 Mamata Biswal, Company Litigation and Jurisdictional Issues: An Incessant 
Challenge in India: Prevailing Multiple Jurisdiction to a Complex Jurisdiction 
under the Companies Act, 2013, 2 Supreme Court Cases Journal 19, 20 (2017) 
(Hereinafter, Biswal). 
8Report of the High-Level Committee on Law Relating to Insolvency and 
Winding-up of Companies (2000), Preface, ¶ 4, (Hereinafter, Eradi Committee 
Report). 




for a Company Law Tribunal.9 Moreover, the Committee expressly 
laid down that appeals from the proposed Tribunal should lie in 
the High Court. It categorically refused the need for an Appellate 
Tribunal.10 The Parliament however, for unknown reasons and 
contrary to the suggestions of the Reserve Bank of India11 and the 
International Monetary Fund,12 chose to establish the Appellate 
Tribunal, through the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002.13 
The 2002 Amendment to the Companies Act, 1956 was challenged 
in the Madras High Court, and subsequently an appeal was desired 
to the Supreme Court by both the original petitioner and the 
government. Both the Courts while upholding the constitutional 
validity of the tribunals, suggested certain guidelines to reform 
certain provisions, which were, in the opinion of the courts, 
unconstitutional or legally unpleasant. Meanwhile, the Parliament 
enacted the Companies Act, 2013 replicating certain provisions, 
which the Supreme Court had asked it to reform, as they suffered 
from unconstitutionality.14 The Court, while asking for the changes 
to be incorporated, reiterated its previous dictum.15 Regardless of 
this, the government chose to constitute the tribunals in 2016. The 
legislation, as it stands, is still unreformed to a large extent, and 
multiple provisions require amendment. 
III. The Constitutionality of the Tribunals 
The suggestions of the Supreme Court and the Madras High Court 
can be roughly divided into two categories – those relating to 
membership, appointments, and like; and those concerned with 
procedures and ancillary affairs 
                                                          
9 3 A RAMAIYA, A GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES ACT 5575 (18th ed. 2015). 
(Hereinafter, RAMAIYA). 
10 Eradi Committee Report, ¶ 4.5 
11 Report of the Advisory Group on Bankruptcy Laws (2001). 
12 RAMAIYA, supra note 9, at 5576. 
13 Companies (Second Amendment) Act, No. 11, Acts of Parliament, 2003. 
14  Biswal,supra note 7, at 20. 
15 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2015) 8 S.C.C. 583. 
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III.1    Membership and Ancillary Provisions 
The Companies Act contains numerous complex and detailed 
provisions that lay down varied aspects of membership of the 
tribunal – qualifications of judicial members, technical members, 
chairperson, and president, their selection process and removal etc. 
Most of these provisions have been identified by the Courts as 
unconstitutional.16 
i. Judicial Members 
Judicial Members of the Tribunal are to be either serving or former 
High Court judges, serving or former District Court judges, with an 
experience in the judiciary of five years, or lastly advocates with ten 
years of practice.17 The Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002 
had also validated the appointment of certain Indian Legal Service 
officials and Indian Company Law Service officials as Judicial 
Members.18 The Courts did not look at this provision favorably, by 
noting that such officers can be appointed as Technical Members, 
but not judicial Members.19 The 2013 Act does not have this 
provision, and therefore this provision should prima facie be 
acceptable to the Courts.  
The Appellate Tribunal has serving or retired High Court judges as 
its Judicial Members. Further, Judicial Members of the Tribunal 
who have served in that position for five years, can also be 
appointed in a similar manner.20 Earlier, there was no distinction 
between Technical and Judicial Members of the Appellate Tribunal 
unlike now.21 Hence, the new statute has reasonably reformed the 
position of Judicial Members of the Appellate Tribunal. 
                                                          
16 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2015) 8 S.C.C. 583; Union of 
India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 1, para 120. 
17 § 409, the Companies Act, No.18, Acts of Parliament, 2013. 
18  § 10FD, the Companies Act, No.1, Acts of Parliament, 1956. 
19 Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 1, para 120(i). 
20 § 411, the Companies Act, No.18, Acts of Parliament, 2013. 
21 § 10FR, the Companies Act, No.1, Acts of Parliament, 1956. 




ii. Technical Members 
The requirements for Technical Members have been subject to more 
criticism, compared to those of Judicial Members. The Courts, 
while examining provisions relating to Technical Members of the 
Tribunal, suggested that since Technical Members must be of the 
same status as Judicial Members, i.e. High Court judges, they 
should have an equivalent experience in their respective field.22 The 
clause allowing Joint Secretaries as Technical Members was 
contrary to this consideration, for it has been analyzed that these 
officers do not have the requisite experience to be held at par with 
Judicial Members of the same tribunal. Only Secretaries and 
Additional Secretaries were held to be at par with High Court 
judges.23 This was with regard to the old provisions, which were 
egregiously continued in the new legislation.24 A later writ petition 
filed by the Madras Bar Association compelled the Court to 
reiterate its verdict once more.25 The government was receptive this 
time, and the pending Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016 does 
incorporate this change, and allows only appointment of 
Additional Secretaries and Secretaries for the post.26 This 
Amendment, along with this particular clause was passed by the 
House of the People without changes in late July, 2017.27 While the 
Amendment may be passed in the Upper House as well, that may 
not solve the issue per se. Clause (e), of sub-section (3), of Section 
409 allows appointment of „persons with proven ability‟ in certain 
fields as Technical Members. Joint Secretaries may still be 
appointed under this provision. Adequate safeguards must be in 
place to ensure that there is no bypassing of the Supreme Court‟s 
guidelines. The Appellate Tribunal on the other hand allows 
appointment of only „persons with proven ability‟. The eligibility 
criteria aside, the entire object of appointing such Technical 
Members on the Appellate Tribunal is contestable. The sole 
                                                          
22 Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 1, para 120(ii). 
23 Id. 
24 RAMAIYA, supra note 9, at 5592. 
25 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2015) 8 S.C.C. 583, ¶ 22-28. 
26  Clause 78, the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016 (No 73 of 2016). 
27 Clause 82, the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016 (No 73-C of 2016). 
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objective of the Appellate Tribunal is to hear appeals from the 
lower Tribunal, solving substantive questions of law, which is a 
judicial function. Further, the only reason to appoint an Appellate 
Tribunal is to ensure expeditious disposal of cases. What 
contribution can a man of technical expertise provide while 
considering pure questions of law? In the light of these contentions, 
it can be argued that Technical Members are not necessarily 
required on the Appellate Tribunal. Unfortunately, the courts did 
not consider this question, and thus, it remained unsolved.28 But, it 
cannot be denied that there is a considerable ground for 
reconsideration of the position of Technical Members on the 
Appellate Tribunal. 
iii. Chairperson and President 
The Companies Act provides for a President to chair the Tribunal 
and a Chairperson to preside over the Appellate Tribunal. The 
former office is open only to a serving or retired High Court judge 
with a five-year experience, while the Chairpersonship of the 
Appellate Tribunal is open to a sitting or retired Supreme Court 
Justice, or a Chief Justice of a High Court.29 Earlier, the 
Chairpersonship was specifically reserved only for retired Supreme 
Court judges,30 but now, the ambit has been widened. Similarly, the 
President could be a person who was “qualified to be” a High 
Court judge,31 a provision which providentially does not find any 
place in the new legislation, ensuring that the office remains in the 
hands of a member of the higher judiciary. 
Section 415 of the Act lays down that, in an event where the 
Chairperson or the President is unavailable or incapable of 
discharging their duties, then, the „senior-most‟ member can 
temporarily serve in that position. The seemingly harmless 
provision has a fundamental flaw, which has not been considered 
by the Courts. The positions of Chairperson and President are to be 
                                                          
28 RAMAIYA, supra note 9, at 5594-5595. 
29 § 409 and § 411, the Companies Act, No.18, Acts of Parliament, 2013. 
30 § 10FR, the Companies Act, No.1, Acts of Parliament, 1956. 
31 Id. at§10FD. 




held by members of the judiciary, while the „senior-most‟ member 
of the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal may not certainly be a 
Judicial Member. Therefore, the possibility that a Technical 
Member may be required to conduct duties of those two offices, 
specifically reserved for judges of the higher judiciary, is a 
disagreeable occurrence.  
iv. Selection Committee 
The members and presiding officers of the tribunals are to be 
appointed by a Selection Committee, which consists of two judges 
and three bureaucrats. Chief Justice of India is the ex officio 
Chairperson of this Committee.32 The majority given to the 
executive members is a direct assault on the independence of the 
judiciary. This Committee is supposed to be a reformed version of 
the previous one, but instead, it suffers from the same fault. The 
earlier enactment had mandated a Committee of five members, the 
Chief Justice and four civil servants.33 The Supreme Court, 
understandably did not accept this proposition. Instead, it 
suggested that there be an equal number of judges and mandarins 
– two each, and the Chief Justice be accorded the pivotal casting 
vote to resolve stalemates.34 Turning a blind eye to this advice, the 
legislature enacted an alternative, which still does not incorporate 
the required change, or achieve the intended goal. This has been 
pointed out by the Supreme Court during the subsequent petition 
as well.35 Having said that, there is the aforementioned amendment 
passed by the House of the People, which is inclusive of this 
change.36 It is imperative that this modification passes in the 
Council of States, as any appointment committee that has  neither  
a majority of judicial members, nor allows primacy to judiciary, is a 
constant, persisting threat to the independence of the judiciary. 
                                                          
32 § 412, the Companies Act, No.18, Acts of Parliament, 2013. 
33 §10FX, the Companies Act, No.1, Acts of Parliament, 1956. 
34 Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 120(x). 
35 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2015) 8 S.C.C. 583, ¶ 29-33. 
36  Clause 80, the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016 (No. 73 of 2016). 
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v. Term of Office 
All members of the tribunals are eligible for a renewable term of 
five-years. The retirement age for the Chairperson, Members of the 
Appellate Tribunal, the President, and Members of the Tribunal is 
seventy, sixty-seven, sixty-seven, and sixty-five years respectively, 
while the uniform minimum age for appointment is fifty.37 The 
earlier law allowed for three-year renewable terms with no 
minimum eligibility age.38 The idea that judges will be dependent 
on an external authority for their reappointment raises the 
apprehension of a threat to the independence of the judiciary. This 
dependence may press them into passing orders favorable to the 
government, as was identified by the Supreme Court.39 
The United States Supreme Court encountered a similar problem. 
In Northern Pipeline Company Limited v Marathon Pipe Line Co,40 the 
Court was called upon to examine the constitutionality of certain 
Bankruptcy Courts, established by the United States Congress. The 
legislation passed by the Congress allowed non-renewable terms of 
fourteen years, but judges could be removed before completion of 
their terms by the executive, in certain situations, without any 
procedure of impeachment. This contradicted the American 
Constitutional principle of life tenure for judges, which the Court 
believed would threaten the neutrality of judges. In a similar 
manner, it can be understood easily by anybody, that the 
dependency on the executive, for reappointment, may compel the 
judges to reconsider their even-handedness. 
National Tax Tribunal, another quasi-judicial body similar to the 
Appellate Tribunal, created by the Parliament to deal with tax 
litigation, was struck down by the Supreme Court, citing the 
renewability of the judges‟ terms as contrary to an independent 
judiciary.41 Therefore, analogously concluding, Section 413 of the 
                                                          
37 § 413, the Companies Act, No.18, Acts of Parliament, 2013. 
38 §10FE and § 10FT, the Companies Act, No.1, Acts of Parliament, 1956. 
39 RAMAIYA, supra note 9, at 5598. 
40 Northern Pipeline Company Limited v Marathon Pipe Line Co, 458 US 
50 (1982). 
41 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2014) 10 S.C.C. 1. 




Act should be revisited, and modified to protect judicial 
independence. 
vi. Removal of Members 
Section 417 deals with removal of members. The government, in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of India, can debar members on 
the grounds of insolvency, conviction for offence involving moral 
turpitude, mental or physical incapability etc. Apart from 
insolvency, which is determined by a court of law, other grounds 
must be proved in an inquiry conducted by a Supreme Court 
Justice. The Supreme Court has laid down that with respect to 
appointment and removal of judges, the term „consultation‟ is to be 
taken as „concurrence‟.42 This is to enhance the independence of 
judiciary to a magnitude where the paramount head of judiciary 
enjoys unprecedented primacy of opinion in matters such as 
appointment and removal of judiciary, which lie at the heart of 
judicial independence. In the aforementioned section, the terms are 
used interchangeably, which may be a non-issue, yet should be 
resolved by inclusion of the word „concurrence‟ throughout the 
provision.43 
III.2 Procedure and Particulars 
i. Benches of the Tribunal 
The Principal Bench of the Tribunal is at Delhi, presided over by 
the President. Generally, the Tribunal is supposed to deal with 
cases consisting of benches comprising of two members, one 
Technical and one Judicial. Further, a single Judicial Member bench 
can also be established if the need so arises. Special benches, 
consisting of three and more members can also be constituted, 
provided that Judicial Members are always in a majority. All 
questions are to be resolved by majority, while in a situation where 
the two members of an ordinary bench disagree with each other, 
                                                          
42 Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 
(1993) 4 S.C.C. 441. 
43 RAMAIYA, supra note 9, at 5606. 
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the President can refer such an issue to a third person, for his 
determinative decision.44 
ii. Orders and Appeals 
The Tribunal is empowered to pass any orders as it deems fit. The 
only prerequisite is that it should hear both parties, before passing 
such orders. Additionally, it can rectify any mistake in its orders, 
within two years of passage of such orders, if one of the parties 
brings it to their notice. Any person aggrieved by an order, has the 
liberty to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, within forty-five days of 
receiving the order.45 Usage of the term „any person aggrieved‟ is 
important here, as not all persons who feel disappointed by a 
judgment are aggrieved. Persons who are wrongfully deprived of 
something can be termed as such, and only they have a right to 
appeal such a decision.46 The powers of the Tribunal are wide and 
far-reaching, and thus, it can have overwhelming impact on 
multiple persons. Therefore, it was prudent on the part of the 
legislature to use the term „any person aggrieved‟, and not „parties 
aggrieved‟. The Delhi High Court, while referring to the Company 
Law Board, has recorded similar observations.47 
Both tribunals are under a statutory mandate to complete 
proceedings within three months. One of the principal purposes of 
the legislation, i.e. expeditious disposal of cases by the 
administrative adjudicating bodies, is codified in Section 422. There 
is an exception for certain circumstances, where a proceeding 
cannot be completed within the stipulated period of time, and the 
President or the Chairperson deems it fit that an extension of 
deadline, not exceeding ninety days, be granted. By conservative 
estimates, a proceeding filed before the Tribunal should be ideally 
disposed of within, a maximum of thirteen to fourteen months, by 
both tribunals. 
                                                          
44 § 419, the Companies Act, No.18, Acts of Parliament, 2013. 
45 Id. at§420. 
46 Adi Pherozeshah Gandhi v. H. M. Seervai, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 385. 
47 Industrial Development Bank of India v. C.L.B., (2007) 81 C.L.A. 356 
(Del). 




Appellate Tribunals orders can be appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court, before expiry of a limitation period of sixty days. Articles 
226 and 227 of the Constitution provide that a High Court has 
jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals in its territorial 
jurisdiction. Hence, every Appellate Tribunal will be technically 
under the purview of a High Court. As those Articles are the basic 
structure of the Constitution, they cannot be parted from.48 
Therefore, every Appellate Tribunal order could be challenged in 
the High Court. However, as the legislature has provided for a 
direct route to the Supreme Court, unnecessary challenges in the 
High Court may not be prudent. Additionally, High Courts are 
expected not to mingle in such matters, unless there is a gross 
violation of principles of natural justice.49 
iii. Contempt 
Tribunals have a power to punish for their own contempt.50 It was 
argued in at least one writ petition, that such a power would be 
unconstitutional. This attempt was unsuccessful. The petitioner had 
argued that such a power would be “unhealthy”.51 There is nothing 
substantial to claim that this power is invalid or unconstitutional. 
VI. Conclusion 
On careful scrutiny and inspection of the tribunals‟ provisions and 
their constitutionality as laid down by the Courts, it can be 
concluded that the unincorporated suggestions are still a vexatious 
blot on the constitutionality of the tribunals. The author proposes 
certain recommendations: 
                                                          
48 S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 124; L. Chandra 
Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 S.C.C. 261. 
49 RAMAIYA, supra note 9, at 5613; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, 
(2003) 6 S.C.C. 675, ¶ 39. 
50 § 425, the Companies Act, No.18, Acts of Parliament, 2013. 
51 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2015) 8 S.C.C. 583, ¶ 34. 
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i. Qualifications of Technical Members of the Tribunal 
Qualifications of Technical Members as of now are not harmonious 
with the Supreme Court‟s guidelines. To achieve that end, there 
would be two modifications required to be made to the Companies 
Act. First, the provision enabling Joint Secretaries to be Technical 
Members should be amended to add only Additional Secretaries 
and Secretaries. This would ensure that only persons who have a 
similar grade as High Court judges are on the Tribunal. And 
second, to disallow colorable use of the legislation, the provision 
allowing „persons with proven ability‟ be amended in a manner 
that would not allow Joint Secretaries to bypass preceding Sections, 
or an express proviso be attached disabling Joint Secretaries from 
availing protection of that sub-section. The Companies 
(Amendment) Bill, 2016 does incorporate the first change. If passed 
by the Council of States, that would solve the prevailing issues, and 
bring the Tribunal in line with the Apex Court‟s interpretation. 
However, the provision of „proven ability‟ still allows a route for 
bypass. 
ii. Necessity of Technical Members on the Appellate Tribunal 
The question of whether Technical Members enrich proceedings 
that determine an issue of law, is intriguing one. The legislature‟s 
prudence of adding them cannot be outright rejected. There must 
be a thorough and reasoned debate on this issue. Even if one 
assumes that Technical Members are not on the Appellate Tribunal, 
this would defeat the entire purpose of having such an appellate 
body. If a group of High Court judges are going to decide these 
appeals, one may as well abolish the Appellate Tribunal, and let 
High Courts determine matters directly, in consonance with the 
suggestions that the Eradi Committee had initially proposed. 
Alternatively, if one chooses to keep Technical Members on board, 
their presence is worthless. Technical expertise can be a 
commendable characteristic for the Tribunal, but that cannot be the 
case with Appellate Tribunal. Further research and discussion is 
required with regards to this aspect. 
iii. Acting Presidents and Chairpersons 
Section 415 as mentioned earlier, allows Technical Members to 
serve on offices reserved for persons with judicial background. 




Although temporary or interim positions, such temporary positions 
would manifestly be wrong, for they allow a disparity in the 
principle that a Judicial Member must be at the helm of the 
tribunals, in the interests of independence of judiciary. Thus, the 
word „Judicial‟ should be added between “senior-most” and 
„Member‟ to resolve the issue. 
iv. Age Qualifications 
There is a requirement that all members of both tribunals should 
have completed fifty years of age, a condition which was absent in 
the older law. Even the Supreme Court can have judges, who are 
fifteen years younger -52 there is nothing which substantiates this 
absurd condition. Therefore, this specification primarily keeps 
capable adjudicators from being appointed. The requirement of age 
should be thus, reconsidered. 
v. Renewability of Terms and Independence of Judiciary 
The renewable terms granted to members of the Tribunal and of 
the Appellate Tribunal are unpleasant and odious. Reappointment 
is dependent on one authority or another, which is not under an 
obligation to provide reasons for rejecting reappointment. Thus, it 
can cause blotting of neutrality of individual judges and the 
Tribunal itself. Therefore, it is reasonable that non-renewable but 
longer terms are accorded on the judges, or the reappointment 
process is freed for administrative control. 
vi. Consultation and Concurrence 
Regardless of the Supreme Court‟s judgment that „consultation‟ 
with regards to appointment and removal of judges mandatorily 
being read as „concurrence‟, the independent existence of the two 
terms in the provision relating to removal of members is 
nauseating. Ideally, there should be an amendment changing every 
„consultation‟ with „concurrence‟. 
                                                          
52 INDIA CONST. art. 124. 
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vii. Third Person Referrals 
If there is a difference of opinion between two members of a bench, 
the President has the authority to refer such a question to a third 
member. This member, who will have the power to determine the 
dispute, can be a Judicial or a Technical Member. If he is the latter, 
then technically that issue has been solved by two Technical 
Members, which is contrary to the overtly obvious intention of the 
legislature, which chiefly purports to have questions determined by 
a majority of Judicial Members. Therefore, term „Judicial‟ should be 
included before „Member‟ in Section 419. 
The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are a commendable 
system of administrative adjudication which can streamline 
company law issues, which is healthy for trade and commerce in 
the country. But adaption of commerce friendly policy should not 
prompt withdrawal of our much cherished legal and juristic 
principles. Therefore, the specific amendments mentioned above 
should be implemented, or considered, to make this admirable 
piece of legislation in consonance with the Constitution. 
 
